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Lookingatmorethan   violentproteststhat aredupinblackneighborhoodsacross
theUnitedStates,Iexaminewhetherincreasedexposuretosignalsofblackunrestis




electionsbetween    and    . Finally,I ndthatincounterfactualscenariosoffewer
violentproteststheDemocraticpresidentialnominee,HubertHumphrey,wouldhave
beatentheRepublicannominee,RichardNixon,inthe    election.
Inthelabexperiment,Itesthowexposuretoimagesofpoliticizedandarmedwhite
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xivNo causation without manipulation.
Holland(    )
1
ReconcilingRaceandCausation




votingbehavior? DidBarackObama’sracecausehimtolosevotesinthe    presidential




causalinferenceonthebasisofraceorethnicity(Holland,    ,    ;Winshipand













































 isarticleproceedsasfollows. InSection . webrie yreviewhowracehasbeen










 .  D       R   
Broadly,twotheoriesofracehavedominatedpriorscholarship.²  e rsttendstoview
raceinlargelybiologicaltermsandtocategorizepopulationsbyregionsofancestryand
² oughraceiso ende nedasabiologicalinheritanceandethnicityasaculturalinheritance,inthis
article we use the terms “race” and “race and ethnicity” interchangeably. We do this for several reasons.
First,manygroups,suchasU.S.Hispanics,insomecontextsarecategorizedasaracialgroupandinothers
as an ethnic group. Second, within political science, the term of choice o en varies by region and sub-
discipline. For example, the term “ethnic minorities” is used by many European social scientists to refer
to groups that would be considered racial minorities within the United States.  ird, as the  eld of epi-
genetics demonstrates, biological, environmental and cultural in uences interact in ways that can make
drawingcleanlinesbetweenraceandethnicitychallenging.




Citro,    ;James,    ).  esecondapproachemphasizestheweakscienti cbasisfor
racialcategoriesandarguesthatraceisbestunderstoodasasocialconstruction(Appiah,




geographicalandlegalin uences(Appiah,    ;López,    ;Loury,    ;Holland,












  .  C     I           P        O       
AbriefoverviewoftheRubinpotentialoutcomesframeworkhelpscontextualizethe
followingdiscussion. ( eliteratureonthistopicisvoluminous e.g.,Rubin(    ),














































andcontrolgroupsareidenticalonbackgroundcovariates(DehejiaandWahba,    ;
Sekhon,    ). Wediscussthesetheutilityofthesetechniquesforraceandpolitics
scholars,below.
 .  H  P        O       B    D   W   R   
Giventhesekeybasicsofthepotentialoutcomesframework,wenowturntoexploring
whyraceandethnicitypresentsuchcausalbugaboos.  eexistingliteraturehas










P       : R   C       M          . Makingcausalinferencesusually
demandsaneatlyde ned,manipulabletreatmentvariable,onethatcanbeeasily








Day(    ),whoarguethat“[c]ausationimpliesthatbyvaryingonefactorIcanmake
anothervary”;Pearl(    ),whodiscussesatlengththeimportanceofaninterventionin




(ImbensandRubin(    )refertothemas“currentlyimmutablecharacteristics,”as
⁴ eliteratureonthispointisrootedasmuchinstatisticsasitisinphilosophyandpoliticalthought–
e.g.,Locke(    ),Hume(    ),andMill(    ). Morerecently,philosopherslookingatthetopichave
advancedtheideathatmanipulationisatthecoreofacausalinquiry,andtreatmentssuchasMenziesand
Price (    ) and Von Wright (    ) focus speci cally on human intervention or action. Others, such as
Hausman (    ), have critiqued this literature as pu ing too much emphasis on human agency, which
has the eﬀect of overlooking the natural or non-human manipulations and interventions that can occur.




identify (Faulkner,     ; Schuyler,     ; Halsell,     ; Griﬃn,     ; Gates,     ; Kim and Lee,     ;




















inferencesareimpermissible(e.g.,Holland(    );Rubin(    );GelmanandHill






















observationalsocialscienceresearch(King,KeohaneandVerba,    ;Rosenbaum,
    ). Touseacommonexample,supposethatweareinterestedinthecausaleﬀectof
smokingondeath,andhaveapopulationofrandomlyassignedsmokersandrandomly








  willbringtothetable. Includinganyofthesea ributeswouldthereforeaﬀectour
estimatesofthecausaleﬀectof“race.”
Althoughperhapsunsatisfactorytomanyappliedresearchers,themostappropriate
initialapproachistodropanypost-treatmentvariablesfromananalysis(King,    ;















controllingforrace-relatedcovariates: ( )commonsupportproblemsand( )problems
⁶Sex, which is also assigned at birth, is one of the few standard control variables that could be con-
strued as being pre-treatment or, at the very least, assigned concurrently with the treatment. Evidence
suggests, however, that sex ratios can vary by latitude, religion, ethnicity and other factors collinear with
race (Gu entag and Secord,     ; Navara,     ). Other possibly pre-treatment factors (e.g., genotype)
arediscussedinVanderWeeleandHernán(    ).





















(Figure . . ). Researcherscouldneverassignthefullbundleoffactorsthatconstitutea
racialidentitytosomesubjectswhileassigningotherstoacontrol;neithercouldthey



























black),categoricalvariables(“ ”ifwhite,“ ”ifblack,“ ”ifLatino,etc.) orpercentages


















GreinerandRubin(    )asthosethatlookattheeﬀectsof“perceivedrace”andby



















application.  us,theresearchdesignbeginswithwell-de nedpotentialoutcomes,is
operationalizedviaacleanexperiment(oracleanexperimentalanalogy),andhasa
precisemomentoftreatment.  ecausalimpactofraceandethnicityisidenti ed,
alleviatingtheproblemscitedabove.
E           E       S      .  esekindsofauditorcorrespondencestudies
havebeenusedexperimentallytomeasureraceandgenderdiscriminationinawide
varietyof elds,⁷includinglaboreconomics,(BertrandandMullainathan,    ),
⁷Pager (    ) provides a good overview of the literature, critiques, and methods. Although the exact
methodology may vary, audit studies usually involve confederates or actors hired by researchers who are
then randomly sent out to the  eld – for example, to diﬀerent employers or to diﬀerent lending agents.
Partly in responseto critiquesaboutpotential biasintroducedby the confederates(Heckmanand Siegel-
man,     ; Heckman,     ), correspondence studies were developed in which matched human appli-
cantswerereplacedwithmatchedpairsof“paper”applicants. BertrandandMullainathan(    ),asnoted
above,randomlyassignedtraditionallywhiteandblacknamestootherwisesimilarresumestoassesshow
  sociology(BoboandJohnson,    ),psychology(Cosmides,ToobyandKuzban,    ;
Bokeretal.,N.d.;Steele,    ;Greenwald,McGheeandSchwartz,    ). Within
politicalscience,arobustpublicopinionliterature(MillerandKrosnick,    ;Huber
andLapinski,    ;Valentino,HutchingsandWhite,    ;Mendelberg,    ;
SnidermanandPiazza,    ;White,    )hasexploitedsomevariantoftheexposure
researchdesigntoestimaterace-basedcausaleﬀects. SnidermanandPiazza(    ),for
example,leveragequestionorderto ndthatthe“meremention”ofaﬃrmativeactionto
whitesurveyrespondentsprovokesmorenegativefeelingstowardsblacks. Mendelberg
(    )createssimulatedtelevisionnewsexperimentstoassesshowracialcuesmight
primeraciala itudesamongwhitevoters. Withintheparticipationliterature,Butlerand
Broockman(    )usedistinctivelyblackandwhitenamestocra putative“constituent”
emailstostatelegislators;emailsfromwhite“constituents”weremorelikelytobe
answeredbywhiterepresentatives. Withinpsychology,Kurzban,ToobyandCosmides
(    )exposesubjectstophotosandtexttosimulateacross-raceconversationand




“decisionmaker”(tousetheterminologyofGreinerandRubin(    )).
Tostepbackamoment,althoughallofthesestudiesexploitdiﬀerenttechniques–
suchsignalsabouttheraceoftheapplicantaﬀectedhiringdecisions. Morerecently,Adida,LaitinandVal-
fort (    ) used a similar technique to measure employment discrimination against Muslims in France.
 ough scholars have viewed audit and correspondence studies as related, we note that all studies em-









asaresult,wehave( )wellde nedpotentialoutcomesand( )aprecise,wellde ned
momentofthetreatmentisassigned. Accordingly,thecausalroleofraceisappropriately
identi ed,providedthoughthasbeengiventothespeci cexperimentaldesign.




    ),howjuriesreacttoHispanicversusnon-Hispanicdeathpenaltydefendants
























shouldbedroppedfromthestatisticalmodel(GreinerandRubin,    ).
 isdiscussioncanbeboileddowntoonekeyidea: whenpossible,conceptualizingan
⁹Greiner and Rubin (    ) refer to this type of observational research as teasing apart the eﬀects of
“perceived” race (as opposed to actual race). We use diﬀerent terminology and draw diﬀerent analogies,
but the research design we suggest here is comparable. Nonetheless, we move away from the “perceived
race” language for two reasons. First, we think the best way to think about the “treatment” in these kinds
of studies is not as perception but, instead as a signal about race. A er all, in an experimental context,
theresearchercanmanipulatethesignaltowhichthesubjectisexposedbutnotwhatthesubjectactually
perceives. Second, perceived race is rarely observed: what a subject perceives occurs within the con nes










































OpportunityexperimentsbyKatz,KlingandLiebman(    )). Wecouldincludewhite
children,butthecross-racecomparisonswouldonlybeusefulfordescriptivepurposes,

















































socialandculturalforces(see,forexample,WestandZimmerman(    );Deaux
(    )). Similarly,wesuggestscholarsa empttodistinguishbetweenwhatmightbe















provideastrongsignalaboutracialorethnicbackground(Changetal.,    ;










S      M             E        R   . Asmallnumberofexperimental
studieshavebegunusingthiskindofelementsofraceapproach. Forexample,one
elementofrace(i.e.,oneofthesticksinthebundle)isself-worthandself-assessment,
whichinturnareamenabletoexperimentalmanipulation. WaltonandCohen(    ),for
example,randomlyassignedcollegefreshmanamessagethatallcollegestudentsstruggle































 .  E        E      : E            A          G  
WeillustratesomeoftheseconceptsviaanempiricalexampletakenfromFryerJrand
Levi (    ),whichexploresthedeterminantsofeducationaloutcomesforwhiteversus
blackchildren. Mostliteratureinthis eldhasfoundthatblackchildrenconsistentlyand
stronglyunderperformoneducationaltests,despiteresearcherscontrollingforavariety






¹¹Of course, this is not the approach taken by all applied researchers. Some researchers, particularly
in race and ethnic politics or in urban politics look at diﬀerent measures – for example, the percent of a
censustractthatisminority. However,lookingatminorityversusnon-minoritypopulationsdoesseemto
bethegeneraldefaultapproach.
  (WIC),( )whetherthemotherwasateenagerattimeofthechild’sbirth(ormore
generally,mother’sage),and( )anamalgammeasureofsocioeconomicfactors.  us,
FryerJrandLevi concludethatsocioeconomicforcesareatplay,andthattheyplausibly
exacerbateovertime,therebycontinuingtodisadvantageblackstudents.












Model ). Focusingonblack-whitediﬀerencesspeci cally,themostinterestingresults
comeinthewayofthescoresonthereadingtests(Models - ). Here,blackstudents
beginwiththetraditionaldisadvantageagainstwhites–controllingfornothingexcept
studentrace,blackstudentsonaverageachievescoresthatare .  lowerthanthatof
whitestudents(Model ). However,includingthethreekeycovariates–( )aproxyfor
theageofthemother,( )acomponentmeasuringsocioeconomicstatus,and( )
participationinWIC–notonlyerasestheeﬀect,actuallyhastheeﬀectofreversingit,
  Table 1.7.1: Replication of Fryer and Levitt (2004).
Mathematics Reading
Model  Model  Model  Model  Model  Model  Model  Model 
(Intercept)  :    :     :     :    :     :     :     :  
( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  )
Black   :     :     :     :     :     :     :    :  
( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  )
Hispanic   :     :     :     :     :     :     :     :  
( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  )
AsianAmerican  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :  
( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  )
Other   :     :     :     :     :     :     :     :  
( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  )
SESComposite  :    :    :    :    :    :  
( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  )
No.ofBooks  :    :    :    :  
( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  )
No.ofBooks    :     :     :     :  
( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  )
Female   :    :  
( :  ) ( :  )
AgeintheFall  :    :  
( :  ) ( :  )
BirthWeight  :    :  
( :  ) ( :  )
TeenageMother   :     :  
( :  ) ( :  )
Mother  orOver  :    :  
( :  ) ( :  )
WIC   :     :  
( :  ) ( :  )
N                                                
R   :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :  
adj. R   :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :  
Resid. sd   :     :     :     :     :     :     :     :  
Standarderrorsinparentheses




  10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
Mother's Age
Black Students White Students
−2 −1 0 1 2
SES Composite Measure
Black Students White Students







students,   ofblackkindergardenerscomefromfamiliesenrolledinWIC,butonly
   ofwhitekindergardenersdo. Similarly,blackstudentsaremorelikelytohavehad






























matching,weusecoarsenedexactmatching(Iacus,KingandPorro,    ). Wematchon
thosecharacteristicsthatwouldbeconsideredpre-treatment,includingthemother’sage
  Table 1.7.2: Change in test scores, after matching, associated with (1) going from high to low SES
scores, (2) having a teenage mother, and (3) coming from a family enrolled in WIC.
ChangeinOutcome    CI Matchedn
Blacks
HavingLowSES - .   (- .  ,- .  )    
HavingTeenMom - .   (- .  ,- .  )     
EnrolledinWIC - .   (- .  ,- .  )     
andthestudent’sweightatbirth. Wedonotmatchonthosecharacteristicsthatwouldbe
aﬀectedbylowSESstatus,suchasthenumberofbooksownedinthehome.





withFryerJrandLevi ’s:  ereisnothinginherentaboutracethatdrivesthe
achievementgap. Rather,wecandisaggregatefactorscommonlyassociatedwithone
racialgroupanda empttomakecausalinferencesaboutthesesortofcharacteristics.
 .  E        E      : W  F       A      M       ?




























  self-identi cationisaboutasstrongformembershipintheRUFandtheCDF,a nding
makesmoresubstantivesense.  eCDF,a erall,isthoughttorepresentMendeinterests.
ToexplorethediﬀerencebetweenMendesandnon-Mendesfurther,wefocus



















interactedmodel,representedinTable . . ,althoughwenotethattheinteractiontermis
  notsigni cant.¹²






























(e.g., Nisbe  and Cohen (    ))
.
Experimental study




to a racial cue
.
Observational study
(e.g., Greiner and Rubin (    ))
.
Experimental study
(e.g., Pager (    ))























 reefurtherissuesareworth agging. First,wesuggestthroughoutthatresearchers
thinkcarefullyaboutpost-treatmentbiasissues.  isisnotanewwarning(e.g.,King,























  Table 1.8.1: Logit Regression Replication of Humphreys and Weinstein (2008). Dependent variable is
membership in the RUF or CDF militia groups.
RUFMembership CDFMembership
Intercept    :      :  
( :  ) ( :  )
MudWalls  :    :  
( :  ) ( :  )
LackofAccesstoEducation  :    :  
( :  ) ( :  )
SupportstheSLPP   :     :  
( :  ) ( :  )
MendeEthnic  :    :  
( :  ) ( :  )
DoesNotSupportAnyParty  :    :  
( :  ) ( :  )
OﬀeredMoneytoJoinRUF  :  
( :  )
FeltSaferInsideRUF   :  
( :  )
FriendofRUFMembers  :  
( :  )
VillagesAccessiblebyFootorBoatOnly   :    :  
( :  ) ( :  )
Farmer  :    :  
( :  ) ( :  )
Student  :    :  
( :  ) ( :  )
Male  :    :  
( :  ) ( :  )
Age  :    :  
( :  ) ( :  )
AgeSquared   :     :  
( :  ) ( :  )
Freetown   :    :  
( :  ) ( :  )
InfantMortality   :     :  
( :  ) ( :  )
OﬀeredMoneytoJoinCDF  :  
( :  )
FeltSaferInsideCDF  :  
( :  )
FriendofCDFMembers  :  
( :  )
N      
Standarderrorsinparentheses
 indicatessigni canceatp <  :  
  Table 1.8.2: Logit Regression Replication of Humphreys and Weinstein (2008). Dependent variable is
membership in the RUF or CDF militia groups. Post-treatment variables have been removed from the
model.
RUF RUF CDF CDF
(Intercept)   :     :     :     :  
( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  )
Mende  :    :    :    :  
( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  )
Gender  :    :    :    :  
( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  )
Age   :     :  
( :  ) ( :  )
AgeSquared  :    :  
( :  ) ( :  )
N            
Standarderrorsinparentheses
 indicatessigni canceatp <  :  
  Table 1.8.3: Comparing models ﬁtted on the Mende population versus on the non-Mende population.
Coefﬁcients are logit estimates (standard errors in parentheses). Outcome variable is whether an individ-
ual joined the CDF or not.
MendeOnly NonMendeOnly
Intercept    :      :  
( :  ) ( :  )
MudWalls  :    :  
( :  ) ( :  )
LackofAccesstoEducation  :    :  
( :  ) ( :  )
SupportstheSLPP  :     :  
( :  ) ( :  )
DoesNotSupportAnyParty  :    :  
( :  ) ( :  )
OﬀeredMoneytoJoinCDF  :    :  
( :  ) ( :  )
FeltSaferInsideCDF  :    :  
( :  ) ( :  )
FriendofCDFMembers   :    :  
( :  ) ( :  )
VillagesAccessiblebyFootorBoatOnly  :    :  
( :  ) ( :  )
Farmer  :    :  
( :  ) ( :  )
Student  :    :  
( :  ) ( :  )
Male  :    :  
( :  ) ( :  )
Age  :    :  
( :  ) ( :  )
AgeSquared   :     :  
( :  ) ( :  )
Freetown  :    :  
( :  ) ( :  )
InfantMortality   :     :  
( :  ) (  :  )
N      
Standarderrorsinparentheses
 indicatessigni canceatp <  :  
  Table 1.8.4: Simple interacted model. Logit coefﬁcients. Outcome variable is membership in the CDF.
(Intercept)   :      :   
( :   ) ( :   )
Mende  :     :   
( :   ) ( :   )
Male  :     :   
( :   ) ( :   )
FriendofCDFMembers  :     :   
( :   ) ( :   )
Mende:FriendofCDFMembers   :      :   
( :   ) ( :   )
Age   :   
( :   )
AgeSquared   :   
( :   )
AIC   :      :   
BIC   :      :   
logL  :      :   
Standarderrorsinparentheses
 indicatessigni canceatp <  :  
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ViolenceandVoting
D                               A               ?
   .  I           
In    ,BarryGoldwatercampaignedforthepresidencypromising“lawandorder”
against“crimeinthestreets.” oughGoldwaterlostinalandslide,twoyearslaterRonald
ReagancloselyechoedGoldwater’srhetoricandwontheCaliforniaGubernatorialracein
ablowout. WhywaslawandorderalosingcampaignstrategyforGoldwaterin    yeta








orderinnationalelectionsfollowingReagan’s    Gubernatorialvictory. While
extrapolatingfromthesinglecaseofCaliforniawouldoﬀerli leinsightintothe
systematiceﬀectsofviolentprotestsonelectoralbehavior,by    ,morethan   other
black-ledviolentprotestshaderuptedacrossthecountry. Inhis    run,Republican
candidateRichardNixonsuccessfullymarshaledtough-on-crimeoratorytogaina




  UnitedStates(Go schalk,    ;Alexander,    ). Yet,whylawandorderemergedasa
salientpoliticalissueinthemid–to-late    sremainsasubjectofscholarlydebate
(Weaver,    ;Murakawa,    ). Inparticular,howviolentprotestsbetween    and
    mighthavein uencedtheriseoflawandorderinAmericanpoliticsremainsunclear.
FormostofAmericanhistory,raceriotswereinitiatedbywhitemobsthatfomented
violenceagainstblacks. OutbreaksofmayhemliketheNewYorkCityDra Riotsof    
couldresultindozensofblackslosingtheirlivesandhundredshavingtheirproperty
stolen(Bernstein,    ). Priortothe    s,black-initiatedriotswererare. Beginning
around    ,however,thenumberofspontaneous,black-initiatedviolentprotestsgrew






eliteactorsandlegislativeoutcomes.  eir ndingspointtoincreasedeﬀortsat
redistributivepoliciesandalso,possibly,increasedinvestmentinrepressivecapacity
(Fording,    ;Giugni,    ).  isliteraturegenerallyoﬀersli leinsightintohowriots
mayhavein uencedthevotingbehaviorofthemasselectorate,however. An
interdisciplinaryliteratureontheriseof“lawandorder”campaignsandpoliciesdebates
whetherrisingcrimeanddisorderledtoa“backlash”amongvoters. Flamm(    )
¹ roughout this article I use a variety of phrases such as political violence, violent protests, black
insurgency, ethnic violence, ethnic riots and urban riots interchangeably. I do this in keeping with the




argumentandsuggestthatforcessuchaselitecampaignstrategies(Weaver,    )and
immigration(Becke andGodoy,    )havebeenthemorerelevantissuesdriving
votingbehavior.
Todate,thedebateoverwhetherviolentprotestshelpedfuelabacklashamonga
signi cantswathofvotershaslackedsystematicquantitativesupport.  eargumentsin
favorofabacklashhavealsolackedawellarticulatedtheoryofwhenandwhyitoccursin
someinstancesbutnotothers(Weaver,    ). Toaddresstheempiricalgap,Iusedata
onvoting,publicopinionandurbanriotstoinvestigateiftheblackpoliticalviolenceof








Examiningcounty-levelvotingpa erns,I ndthatinthe    presidentialelection
exposuretoviolentprotestsisstronglyandnegativelyassociatedwithDemocraticvote
share. I ndasimilarnegativerelationshipbetweenexposuretoviolentprotestsand
Democraticvoteshareincongressionalelectionsbetween    and    . Examining
counterfactualscenarios,Iestimatethatfewerviolentprotestsareassociatedwitha
  substantiallyincreasedlikelihoodthattheDemocraticpresidentialnominee,Hubert










data,modelsandresultsinSections , and . InSection ,Idiscusspossibleextensions
and, nally,oﬀerconcludingthoughtsinSection .
 .  T      ,          
OnanunusuallywarmeveninginAugust    inWa s,apredominantlyblack
neighborhoodofLosAngeles,LeeMinikus,awhiteCaliforniahighwaypatrolmanpulled






  cars. Amidapoorlycoordinatedpoliceresponse,rumorsofpoliceaggressionagainsta
pregnantwomancirculatedwidelyandfurtherin amedthecrowd.  enextdaylocal
blackleadersa emptedtocalmthesituationbut,bynightfall,anewwaveviolentprotest
beganthatdidnotendfor vemoredays. A ersixtotaldaysofprotestsandriots,  






















Oct. 1966 Poll: ''Compared to a year ago, does the fear of racial violence make you feel personally more uneasy or not?''
Figure 2.2.1: Bar plot of public opinion on the fear of racial violence in California, by race. Sources:
Louis Harris and Associates, Inc. (1966) in California.
 eWa suprisingtransformedSouthCentralLosAngelesandCaliforniapolitics.
IncumbentGovernorofCaliforniaPatBrownhada  percentapprovalratinginJanuary
of    ,butwithalonglistoflegislativeaccomplishmentsandaboomingeconomy,







Too fast Not fast enough About right Don't know
Jul. 1965 National Poll: ''Do you think the Johnson Administration 
 is pushing integration too fast, or not fast enough?''






Too fast Too slow About right Not sure
Oct. 1966 California Poll: ''All in all, do you feel that on
 civil rights, Negroes have tried to move too fast,
 too slow or at about the right pace?'' (Whites, N=523)
Figure 2.2.2: Bar plot of public opinion on civil rights among whites in California in 1965 and 1966.
Sources: Left panel from The Gallup Organization (1965). Right panel from Louis Harris and Associates,
Inc. (1966) in California.
unravel. IntheDemocraticprimaryforgovernor,LosAngelesmayorSamYorty
challengedtheincumbentandcapturedasurprising  percentofthevotebycourting






sometangibleinsightintothelevelofracialanxietyamongwhitevotersa erWa s.  e
rightpanelofFigure . . presentstheresponsesofwhitestoaLouisHarrisand
Associates,Inc.(    )pollquestionfromOctober,    . Whenasked,“Comparedtoa
  yearago,doesthefearofracialviolencemakeyoufeelpersonallymoreuneasyornot?”
  percentofwhiteCaliforniansrespondedaﬃrmativelywhile  percentindicatedthat
theydidnotfeelmoreuneasyascomparedwithayearago. Bycontrast,thoughalmostall
oftheviolenceinitiatedbyprotestorsandpolicetookplacewithinblackneighborhoods,
asseeninthele panelFigure . . ,onlyabout  percentofblackCaliforniansfelt
uneasyand  percentdidnotfeeluneasy.
Figure . . presentstwobarplotsofpublicopinionpollsonthequestionofwhether
thepushforintegrationandcivilrightswasmoving“toofast.” Inthele panel,whichwas
conductedwithanationalsamplepriortotheWa suprisinginAugustof    ,  
percentofrespondentsagreethattheJohnsonAdministrationispushingtoofaston
integration.  erightpanel,conductedwithinCaliforniaa erWa s,presentsresponses
tothequestion“Allinall,doyoufeelthatoncivilrights,Negroeshavetriedtomovetoo
fast,toosloworatabouttherightpace?”’ Amongwhiterespondents,  percentchose
“Toofast,” percentchose“Tooslow,”and  percentresponded“Aboutright.”²  ough




Figure . . ,thenumberofurbanriotsgrewdramaticallyfrom    through    ,the
yearofMartinLutherKing,Jr.’sassassination,andthendeclinedalmostasquickly. A
²In contrast to whites,    percent of blacks responded “Too fast,”    percent responded “Too slow”
and  percentresponded“Aboutright.” (LouisHarrisandAssociates,Inc.,    ).
³ e only other major civil rights related event in that period was the enactment of the Voting Rights
Act (V ) in August of     . It seems implausible that the V  could have moved white opinion in
California so dramatically given that blacks were already enfranchised in California and the V  did not
applyinthestate.
  growingbodyofevidencesuggeststhatriotscanspreadinacontagion-likemanner















Figure 2.2.3: Bar plot of riots by year, 1964 to 1971. Sources: Carter (2005)
WhetherornottheWa suprisingservedasacriticalturningpoint,urbanriotactivity
increasedmarkedlya er    .  espikeanddeclineinriotactivitycorrespondstoa
similarriseandfallinpublicconcernabout“socialcontrol.” Figure . . presentsdataon
whatAmericans,whensurveyed,indicatedwasthe“mostimportantproblem”facingthe
countrybetween    and    . InFigure . . ,thepercentageofAmericanslisting
“socialcontrol”asthemostimportantproblemremainedinthesingledigitsuntilthe
mid-    swhenitspikedandreachedaninitialpeakofabout  percentinAugustof























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Public Opinion on 'Most Important Problem,' 1950−1980
Figure 2.2.4: Scatter plot of public opinion on the ‘Most Important Problem,’ 1950 to 1980. Source: Loo
and Grimes (2004); Niemi, Mueller and Smith (1989). (Lines smoothed with Loess curve.)
Aplotofriotandpublicopiniondatashowsastrongcorrelationbetweenriotsand
demandforlawandorderatthenationallevel. Figure . . presentsaplotofriotseverity
for   rioteventsbymonthandyearusingdatafromCarter(    )andpublicopinion
datafromfromNiemi,MuellerandSmith(    ).  eloggednumberofarrestsis
presentedonthele -handy-axis.  epublicopiniondatascaleispresentedonthe
right-handy-axisanddetailswhatpercentofthosesurveyedidenti ed“socialcontrol”as






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2.2.5: Scatter plot of logged riot arrests (left y-axis) and public opinion on ‘social control’ (right
y-axis), 1964 to 1971. Sources: Niemi, Mueller and Smith (1989); Carter (2005). The ten riots in which
more than 1,000 people were arrested are labeled with abbreviated city names.
AsevidencedinFigure . . theWa suprising(labeledLAintheplot,aboveAugust,
    )wassubstantiallydiﬀerentfromanyotherurbanriotin    or    (especially
whenconsideringthatthescaleislogarithmicanddoesnotaccountfortherecordlevels
⁴ e “social control” measure is a composite of several diﬀerent categories including concern about
crime, civil unrest, communist agitators, juvenile delinquency and other issues.  e polling data is also
sourced from more than one pollster. For a critique of this composite measure, see Loo and Grimes
(    ). Evidence suggests that many citizens con ated issues like violent protests and communist agi-
tationsoIusethecompositemeasurewithoutadjustment(Flamm,    ).
⁵ eNiemi,MuellerandSmith(    )publicopiniondataisthesameasinFigure . . exceptthatI
onlypresentthepercentageofpeoplewhosay“socialcontrol”isthemostimportantproblemandexclude
themeasuresforcivilrights,foreignpolicyandtheeconomy.
  ofarsonthatoccurred). AccordingtothedatapresentedinFigure . . ,nationalpublic
concernabout“socialcontrol”onlyspikesmodestlyfollowingtheWa sriotbutdoes
generallyexhibitcumulativelyhigherpeaksandvalleyswitheachsuccessivewaveof














Figure 2.2.6: Bar plot of urban uprisings by month. Sources: Carter (2005).
Moresigni cantly,thepublicopiniondataexhibitssigni cantvariationwithinyear.
Consistentacrossalmosteveryyearisapeakaroundmid-yearandatrougharoundthe
newyear. Figure . . presentsthefrequencyof    sand    surbanriotsbymonth.
AscanbeseeninFigure . . riotsaresubstantiallymorecommoninthesummer
monthsandlesscommoninthewintermonths.  eoneexceptionalmonth,April,is
drivenbythelargenumberofriotsthatoccurreda ertheassassinationofMartinLuther
  King,Jr.in    .⁶
Additionalevidencefromotherhistoricalandpublicopinionsourcessuggests
widespreadconcernamongthemasspublicaboutcrimeanddisorder. Weaver(    )
notesthatMembersofCongressweredelugedwith“torrentsofconstituentmail”infavor
the    SafeStreetsbillandthatevenliberalDemocrats“feltcompelledbypublic
anxietyovercrimeandriotstovoteforthebill”(p.    ). Figure . . presentspolling
datafromAugust,    inwhich  percentofrespondentsagreedwiththestatement
“Lawandorderhasbrokendowninthiscountry”(LouisHarrisandAssociates,Inc.,
    a).
Inthe    presidentialelection,NixonandHumphreypolledatsimilarlevelson
manyissues. Onlawandorder,however,awidegulfexistedinpublicperceptionsofthe
twocandidates. Figure . . presentstheresultsofapollthatasked“Whichpresidential
candidatedoyoufeelcoulddothebestjobinhandlinglawandorder?” Notonlydid
respondentsfavorNixonoverHumphreyby  to  percent,butthirdpartycandidate
GeorgeWallacealsobeatHumphreyinthepollby  to  percent.  oughthesepolls
oﬀernoinsightintothesourceoftheanxiety,theresultsdosuggestthatsuchanxieties
⁶ esynchronousseasonalvariationinriotactivityandnationalpublicconcernabout“socialcontrol”
does not rule out the possibility that the correspondence is driven by factors other than civil unrest, such
as seasonal variation in crime. One possible argument against seasonal confounders, such as crime, is
visible in the variation in public opinion for “social control.” Across the eight years of data presented in
Figure  . . , public opinion is generally single peaked, typically around July. In      and     , however,
public opinion is double peaked with a rise and decline followed by a second rise and fall. Any theory of
the seasonal concern for “social control” ought to be able to explain both the typical years as well as the
atypical years.  is double spike in      might plausibly be explained by con icting feelings of anxiety
and sympathy for the violent protests that followed the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr.. In     ,
thesecondpeakinpublicopinionoccursinOctober,betweenlowsinAugustandNovember.  eOctober
spike is plausibly explained by the A ica prison uprising which took place on September  th,     .  e







Agree Disagree Not Sure
Aug. 1968 Poll: ''Law And Order 
 Has Broken Down In This Country''
Figure 2.2.7: Bar plot of public opinion on “law and order.” Sources: Louis Harris and Associates, Inc.
(1968a). Respondents were asked “(Now I want to read you some statements about law and order in
this country. For each, tell me if you tend to agree or disagree)... Law and order has broken down in this
country.”
werepervasiveandworkedverymuchtoNixon’sbene t.
 .  C                                  ?









Nixon Wallace Humphrey Not Sure
Sept. 1968 Poll: ‘‘Which presidential candidate do you 
 feel could do the best job in handling law and order?''
Figure 2.2.8: Bar plot of public opinion on presidential candidates and law and order. Sources: Louis
Harris and Associates, Inc. (1968b).








⁷AccordingtodatapublishedbyBositis(    ,Table ,p ),between    and    blackpartyiden-
ti cation with Democrats averaged about    percent. Between      and     , black party identi cation




















































































onethnicriotsandvotinginthe eldofcomparativepolitics,andonthe    surban
riotsinthe eldofAmericanpolitics.  eAmericancaseisanimportant,o enmissing
partoftheconversationincomparativepolitics. Similarly,thefocusinAmericanpolitics
onelitedecision-makingduringthe    surbanriotsmissesthemassconsequencesof
politicalviolenceondemocraticpolitics,showntogreateﬀectelsewhereintheworld.
⁸ ese three proposed models are not meant to be exhaustive or de nitive. For example, the true
relationship between ethnic violence and Democratic vote share might exhibit some non-linearities in
which small riots exert li le or no eﬀect and large incidents of violent protest exert a disproportionate
eﬀect.
   . .  E     R       E          C          P          













Reconstructionandthe    s,Wilkinson(    )doesnotaddresshowthe
electoral-incentivesmodelwouldapplytotheurbanriotsofthe    sand    s.  e





post-    riots.  ereisnoevidenceofwhichIamawareoflocalpoliticiansintheU.S.
strategicallyincitingriotsforelectoralgain,andnopa ernofstateornationalactors












increasedspendingonsocialprogramsby    billion(Kapur,    ). Similarly,inthe
wakeofthe    sand    surbanriots,scholarshavefoundthatpoliticalelites
respondedtothecivilunrestthroughincreasedspendingonwelfareprogramslikeAidto
FamilieswithDependentChildren(AFDC)andotherredistributivepolicies(Fording,
    ,    ;Skrentny,    ;HicksandSwank,    ;IsaacandKelly,    ;Clowardand
Piven,    ).
Inadditionto“carrots,”statesalsomobilize“sticks”inwhicheﬀortsatrepressionmay




policingandeﬀortsatcoercivecontrol(YatesandFording,    ;Fording,    ;Welch,

















 . .  R          R     P       P       
Athirdliteraturethatinvestigatestheeﬀectsofriotsonvotingisprimarilyconcerned
withtheoriginsoflawandordercampaignstrategiesandpolicies.  eoriesthata empt
  toexplaintherisingsalienceofcrimeinthepublicconsciousnessincludearesponseto
growingnumbersofmigrantsandimmigrants(Becke andGodoy,    ),aneedabsorb
“surpluslabor”(Wacquant,    ),aproductofthe“prison-industrialcomplex”
(Schlosser,    ),successivewavesofanti-crimecampaigns(Go schalk,    ),therise
ofthewarondrugs(Boboand ompson,    ;Miron,    ),post-warsocial,
ideologicalandtechnologicaltransformationsin“latemodern”societies(Garland,
    ),theneedtobuildwinningconservativegoverningcoalitions(Simon,    ),and
moralitypolitics(Meier,    ).
Whileeachoftheseworksoﬀersinsightintotheriseofpunitivepolitics,mostfailto
oﬀeraconvincingargumentabouttiming. “Lawandorder”rhetorichasalonghistoryin
theUnitedStates(Finkelman,    ;Murakawa,    )andsoanysuccessfultheoryof
lawandorderpoliticsshouldexplainthedramaticriseinsalienceofsocialcontrolinthe
    sandearly    s.  etheoriesofWacquant(    ),Schlosser(    ),Go schalk
(    ),Simon(    ),Garland(    )andMeier(    )aretoogeneraltosatisfythis
concernandcannotadequatelyexplainwhythelawandordercampaignsarosenationally
inthemid-tolate-    sratherthanintheyearsbeforeora er. Similarly,analyseslike




Becke andGodoy(    )oﬀeracross-nationalperspectiveof“hyper-penality”
acrosstheAmericas. Narrowly,Becke andGodoycitearangeofscholarshipthat
suggestsinternalmigrationandimmigrationfuelsfearandanxietybynativesandlocals
  who,inturn,supportpunitiveresponsestocrime. IntheU.S.,internalmigrationwas
occurringforhalf-a-centurybeforepunitivepoliticsbecomepopular. Between    and
    ,intheSecondGreatMigration,approximately vemillionblacksmovedfromthe
SouthtotheNorthandWest(seeFigure . . ). Despitethismassivedemographicshi ,
publicopiniondataontheconcernfor“socialcontrol”suggestsitremainedlargelya
non-issueuntilthemid-    sandthenincreasedjustasoverallblackmigration atlined.
Consequently,whilemigrationmayhavebeenanecessarycomponentoftherisingdesire
forlawandorderitdoesnotappeartobehavebeensuﬃcientonitsown.
Percentage of blacks residing in South
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Year
Black Population by Percent in South and of US, 1790−2000
Figure 2.3.2: Line plot of black population by percent in South and of U.S. Source: U.S. Census Bureau,




particularlyinresponsetocrimeandriots(Flamm,    ). Flammoﬀersanhistorical
accountoftheemergenceoflawandorderpoliticsbeginningwithgrowingconcerns
aboutjuveniledelinquencyinthelate    s. Flammarguesthatrisingratesofcrimeand
civilunrestinthe    swerethekeysparkmotivingchangesinvotersentiment. Weaver
(    ),bycontrast,rejectsthismassmobilizationor“backlashnarrative”infavorofa
theoryof“frontlash”oranelite-ledpushthatcausedcitizenstobeconcernedwithcrime.














whatsortsofelectoralorpolicyoutcomesshouldbeexpected(Weaver,    ,   ).
 oughthefrontlashaccountismorefullytheorized,theevidenceinsupportofitis
  ambiguous. Weaverwrites“[t]wocrisesservedtoelevatethestatusofviolenceasa
politicalissue: crimeandriots”(p.    )yetalsoarguesthat“crimeisnottheprimary
explanation”for“whycrimecametobepoliticizedinthe    sandnotbefore”(p.    ).
 efrontlashhypothesisalsoemphasizestheimportantroleofthe    Republican
presidentialnomineeBarryGoldwater’snominationspeechandcampaignintriggering
concernaboutcrimeinthegeneralpublic(Weaver,    ,   ). Weaver’sowndata,
however,suggestthatthe rstspikeincrimesaliencecamein    ,abouttwoyearsa er
Goldwater’s    campaignanda eramodestdipinpartof    .  epublicopinion







on“socialcontrol”seeninFigure . . .  ebigspikeinconcernabout“socialcontrol”in
    ,anoﬀ-electionyear,posesanadditionalpuzzleforanelite-drivenmodel.
Anadditionalquestionoftimingandgeographyremainsforthethefrontlashtheory.
Finkelman(    ,    )notethattheargumentthatcrimebecameincreasingly




  rightthroughGoldwater’s    presidentialelectionbutthen rstbecomeascendent
regionallyinCaliforniain    andnationallyin    ?
 . .  V       ,V        R     T     
Toaddresstheseandotherconcerns,Iproposeanextensiontotheliteratureonviolence
andvotingthatincorporatesracialthreat. FollowingKey(    ),asubstantialliterature
hasdevelopedinvestigatingtherelationshipbetweenvotingbehaviorandthepresenceof









votingpa erns.⁹ SurveyresearchinLosAngelesbeforeanda ertheWa sriotfoundthat
AfricanAmericansbecamemoreblack-identi edfollowingtheunrest(Searsand
McConahay,    ). Similarly,theperceivedexistentialthreatmechanismsuggeststhat,
inresponsetofearsaboutout-groupviolence,realorimagined,in-groupandout-group
cleavagesbecomemorepronouncedandconcernsaboutsecuritybecomemoresalient.
⁹Whether perceived existential threat exists as a complement to or component of material threat de-
pendsinpartonthede nitionofmaterialthreat. IfbymaterialcompetitionEnosincludesracializedfears
of possible harm to one’s body, family or property, then my conception of existential threat would be a
subsetofmaterialthreat.
  Inessence,theurbanriotsprovokedmanywhitestobecomemorewhite-identi edand
triggeredaHobbesianmindsetinmanywhitevotersthatprioritizedin-grouporderand










weekenda erWa s”(Flamm,    ,  ). Similar,trendsplayedoutnationally. Farley
(    )reportsthatabout   ,   gunsweresold,peryear,inthe rsthalfofthe    s
butthatmorethantwomilliongunsweresold,peryear,inthela erhalfofthe    sand
early    s. CitingareportfromtheNationalCommissionontheCausesand
PreventionofViolence(Newton,ZimringandonFirearms,    ,Figure  - ),Farley
alsopointsout,“inmanycitiesasharpincreaseingunsalesandregistrationsfolloweda
riot. InDetroit,forexample,thenumberofhandgunpermitsissuedbythepolice




  change,perse,thattriggersanincreaseinthelikelihoodasigni cantmajorityofwhites
voteagainsttheblack-alignedpartybut,rather,racialchangethatoccursinconcertwith
racializedmassviolence.  us,passageofthe    CivilRightsActdidnotprevent
LyndonJohnsonfromwinningthe    presidentialelectioninalandslideandwiththe
supportofamajorityofwhites(thelastDemocratpresidentialnomineetodoso(Lublin,






commi ingtheactsofcollectiveethnicviolence.  egroupthatperceivesitselftobe
undera ackwillalsoshi towardspartiesthatarestronglyidenti edwiththein-group.
Putsimply,urbanriotshelpedraisethesalienceofwhitenessinelectionsandincreased








anxiety,Nixon’s    presidentialcampaigncleverlymarriedaliberalemphasisonrights
  withconservativeconcernsaboutorder. Forexample,duringhisnominationspeech,
Nixonproclaimed,“freedomfromfear”isthe rstcivilrightofallAmericans(Flamm,



































electionsbetween    and    .  ecounty-levelvotingdataisdrawnfromClubb,
FlaniganandZingale(    )andtheelectoralvotedataistakenfromLeip(    ). Asa
control,thebaselinecountytendencytovoteDemocraticinelectionsiscalculatedfrom
themeanDemocraticvoteshareinthetwelveyearspriorto    (i.e.fourpresidentialor
sevencongressionalelections).
 eexplanatoryvariablemeasuringexposuretoriotsisbuiltfromdataon   urban
riotsthatoccurredbetween    and    . Carter(    )de nesariotasaneventthat
involvesatleast  participantsandgeneratesadetectablelevelofinjuryorproperty
damage.  eriotdatafromCarter(    )providesthedate,cityandstateofeach
disturbanceaswellasseveralmeasuresoftheriot’sseveritysuchasthenumberofarrests,
  injuriesanddeaths. AsevidencedinFigure . . ,amapofthelocationsofriotclusters,
thephenomenonwasnationalinscopewiththeexceptionoftheinlandregionbetween
thePaci ccoastandthemidwest.
Figure 2.4.1: Map of the geographic distribution and severity of urban uprisings, 1964-1971. More se-
vere riots are indicated by a larger radius. Bullseye-like circles indicate multiple riots of varying severity
within the same city.
 eriottreatmentisacompositevaluethatincorporatesmeasuresofdistance,time
andriotintensity.  edistancemeasureisabinarymeasurethatthattakesthevalueone





¹¹All cities and riots were geocoded at the city-level using http://batchgeo.com’s interface to Google
Maps.












































Figure 2.4.2: Scatter plot of the estimated riot ‘treatment,’ by year for all counties. Each dot represents
one county in one year with the observations slightly jittered for better data visualization.
 etimemeasurecalculatesthenumberofdaysbetweenthedateoftheriotandthe




theriot.  isanalysisusesthenumberofarreststhatoccurattheriotevent.  enumber
ofarrestsisscaledbytakingthecuberoot.
Table 2.4.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Min Median Mean Max SD
     County Population    .     ,   .     ,   .    ,   ,   .      ,   .  
     Birth Rate per  ,     .     .     .     .    .  
     County   Black  .    .    .    .    .  
Riot Arrests  .     .     .    ,   .      .  
Riot Injuries  .    .     .    ,   .     .  
Riot Acts of Arson  .    .     .    ,   .      .  
Riot Deaths  .    .    .     .    .  
Days of Rioting  .    .    .     .    .  
     Riot ‘Treatment’  .    .    .      .     .  
     Riot ‘Treatment’  .    .     .      .     .  
     Riot ‘Treatment’  .     .     .      .      .  
     Riot ‘Treatment’  .     .     .      .     .  
     Riot ‘Treatment’  .     .     .      .     .  
Additionalcounty-leveldataonresidentpopulation,racialcomposition,andbirthrate
aretakenfromthe    and    censuses. For    ,    ,and    ,Iestimate
linear-interpolationsoftheresidentpopulationandpercentblackbetween    and
    .¹² Summarystatisticsfortheriot‘treatment’compositeandthedemographicdata
arepresentedinTable . . .
 ecensusprovidesdataonthenumberofwhiteandblackresidentswithineach
¹²According toGeoLytics, Inc.(    ), more detaileddatais not availableatthe county-level until the
    census. Futureextensionswill a empttoincorporatenon-censusdatafrom“County andCityData
Books” (Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research,     ) as well as data from other
state-levelor SMSA-levelsources.
  county. Fromthesedata,anestimateofthepercentageofthecountythatisblackis
calculated(nodataisavailablein    onresidentpopulationthatisneitherwhitenor
black).  erelationshipbetweentheracialcompositionofacountyandthechangein
Democraticvoteshareappearstobenon-linearandsoasquaredtermisincludedaswell.
 .  M                                         
Usingordinaryleastsquares,Iestimatetherelationshipbetweenexposuretoriotsand
votingbehaviorinasfollows:
votei = α + β treati + β perblacki + β (perblacki)
  +
+β log(popi) + β birthsi + β lagi + β xi + εi ( . )
 etermvotei isthepercentageofthevotereceivedincountyibytheDemocratic
presidentialcandidateinagivenelectionyear.  etermtreati representstheriot
‘treatment’forcountyiinthatelectionyearandisde nedinmoredetailinEquation . .
 eperblacki termmeasuresthepercentofeachcountythatisblackandtheperblack 
i
termisthesamemeasuresquared.  elog(popi)termisthelogofthecountypopulation




region-levelorstate-level xedeﬀectsand εi istheerrorterm.
Ialsoestimateapanelmodeloftherelationshipbetweentheriot‘treatment’and
  votinginpresidentialandcongressionalelections.  ispanelmodelissimilartothatin
Equation . buteachobservationisauniquecounty-yearpairandthemodelincludes
countyandyear xedeﬀects.  epanelmodelisspeci edinEquation . and,where
appropriate,thetermsareindexedfortheyearjinwhichtheyareobserved.  us,voteij
representstheDemocraticvoteshareincountyiinyearj.
voteij = α + β treatij + β perblackij + β (perblackij)
  +





distanceik  timejk  intensityk ( . )










  Moreprecisely,inthemodel,eachcountyireceivesaunique‘treatment’iinyearj.  e
treatmentij isthecumulative‘eﬀect’orsumofallkriotsoccurringpriortotheelectionin
yearj.  edistanceik isabinarymeasurethatequalsonewhentheeachriotkandeach
countyiareatleastwithin   milesofeachotherandzerootherwise.  etimejk isan
inversescalednumberofdaysbetweenriotjandtheelectiondayinyeark.  eintensityj
isascalednumberofarrestsinriotj. timejk isscaledbyanon-lineardecayfunction.
 .  E                         ‘         ’  D             
     
Table . . presentstheestimatedassociationbetweentheyear-speci criot‘treatment’
andthecounty-levelDemocraticpresidentialvoteshareinthe    ,    and    
elections. In    ,aoneunitincreaseintheriot‘treatment’isassociatedwithabouta
- . percentagepointchangeinthecounty-levelDemocraticvoteshare(   CI:- . ,
- . ).  oughstatisticallysigni cantatconventionallevels,the   con denceinterval
iswide,perhapsowingtothesmallnumberofriotsoccurringpriortothe    
presidentialelection.¹³ In    ,aoneunitincreaseintheriot‘treatment’ismore
preciselyestimatedatabouta- . percentagepointchangeintheDemocraticvoteshare
(   CI:- . ,- . ). Likewise,in    ,aoneunitincreaseintheriot‘treatment’is
associatedwithanapproximately- . percentagepointchangeintheDemocraticvote
¹³In    ,mostcountiesareestimatedtohavereceivedalmostnoriot‘treatment.’  erefore,the    
presidentialelectionmayrepresentthebestcomparisonof‘treated’andcontrolcounties(SeeTable . . ).
By     , according to the model, all counties experienced some degree of exposure.  us, the large esti-
mated eﬀect of riots on Democratic vote share in      may represent a more accurate assessment of the
eﬀectofriotsonvotingbehaviorandthelaterelectionsmaybebiaseddownwardbytheabsenceofatrue
untreatedcontrolgroup. IthankMichaelTeslerforthisinsight.
  Table 2.6.1: Riot ‘Treatment’ on Democratic Presidential Vote Share, 1964 to 1972
              
Riot ‘Treatment’   :     :     :  
( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  )
Percent Black    :      :      :  
( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  )
(Percent Black)    :      :     :  
( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  )
Log(Population)  :    :    :  
( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  )
Birth Rate  :    :    :  
( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  )
Mean Dem. Vote Share (’  -’  )  :    :    :  
( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  )
Percent Pop. Growth   :     :     :  
( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  )
Median Age  :    :    :  
( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  )
Median Income (   s)  :    :    :  
( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  )
Median Years Schooling   :     :     :  
( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  )
Percent Unemployed  :    :    :  
( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  )
Percent Foreign Born  :    :    :  
( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  )
Per Capita Gov. Revenue  :    :    :  
( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  )
N               
R   :    :    :  
adj. R   :    :    :  
Resid. sd  :    :    :  
Standarderrorsinparentheses
 indicatessigni canceatp <  :  
Riot‘Treatment’calculatedseparatelyforeachelection
Regionalcontrolsnotpresented
  share(   CI:- . ,- . ).
 esummarystatisticspresentedinTable . . showthattheestimatedriot
‘treatment’for    rangesfromaminimumof inApache,AZ(farfromanysigni cant
riotactivity)toamaximumofabout inPo er,PA(closetooneofthelargestriotsin
Newark,NJ). us,theresultsinTable . . ,suggestthatexposuretoriotsmayhave
resultedinashi inDemocraticvotesharefromabout percentagepointsintheleast
exposedcountiestoabout- . percentagepointsinthemosthighlyexposedcounties. In
sum,theseresultssuggestthatexposuretoriotssigni cantlyin uencedcounty-level
presidentialvotingpa ernsbetween    and    .
Table . . presentstheestimatedassociationbetweentheyear-specifcriot‘treatment’
andthecounty-levelDemocraticcongressionalvoteshareinthe veelectionsbetween
    and    . Unlikethepresidentialelectionresults,in    and    ,theriot
‘treatment’exhibitsapositiveandinsigni cantrelationshipwithDemocraticvoteshare.
Beginningwiththe    election,however,theresultsinTable . . suggestthataone
standarddeviationincreaseinacounty’sexposuretotheriot‘treatment’wasassociated
witha- . percentagepointchangeDemocraticvoteshareincongressionalelections
(   CI:- . ,- . ). Similarly,in    aoneunitincreaseinacounty’sexposuretothe
riot‘treatment’wasassociatedwitha- . percentagepointchangeDemocraticvoteshare
incongressionalelections(   CI:- . ,- . )and,in    ,a- . percentagepoint
changeDemocraticvoteshare(   CI:- . ,- . ).¹⁴
¹⁴One diﬀerence between the presidential and the congressional model is that, in the la er case, the
data appeared to be signi cantly noisier than in former. To address a non-trivial number of districts with
extremevalues(i.e.almostallthevotesforoneparty),countieswithalaggedmeanDemocraticvoteshare
(again, the past seven elections) less than   or greater than    are dropped from the analysis.  e results
arerobusttothischange.
  Table 2.6.2: Association between Riot ‘Treatment’ and Democratic Congressional Vote Share, 1964 to
1972
                        
Riot ‘Treatment’  :     :     :     :     :  
( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  )
Percent Black  :     :      :     :      :  
( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) (  :  ) (  :  )
(Percent Black)    :    :     :      :     :  
(  :  ) (  :  ) (  :  ) (  :  ) (  :  )
Log(Population)  :    :    :    :    :  
( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  )
Birth Rate   :     :     :     :     :  
( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  )
Mean Cong. Dem. Vote Share (’  -’  )  :    :    :    :    :  
( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  )
Percent Pop. Growth   :    :     :     :     :  
( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  )
Median Age  :    :     :     :    :  
( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  )
Median Income (   s)  :     :    :    :    :  
( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  )
Median Years Schooling   :     :     :     :     :  
( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  )
Percent Unemployed  :    :    :    :    :  
( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  )
Percent Foreign Born  :    :    :    :    :  
( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  )
Per Capita Gov. Revenue  :    :    :    :    :  
( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  )
N                         
R   :    :    :    :    :  
adj. R   :    :    :    :    :  
Resid. sd  :     :     :     :     :  
Standarderrorsinparentheses
 indicatessigni canceatp <  :  
CountieswithmeanDem. voteshare< or>  excludedfromanalysis
Riot‘Treatment’calculatedseparatelyforeachelection
Regionalcontrolsnotpresented
  Between    and    ,theresultsinTable . . ,suggestthatexposuretoriotsmay
haveresultedinashi inDemocraticvotesharefromalowof percentagepointsinthe
leastexposedcountiesofthe    congressionalelection(again,Apache,AZ)toapeak
ofabout- . percentagepointsinthemosthighlyexposedcountiesofthe    
congressionalelection(suchasColumbia,PA).
Table 2.6.3: Panel Models of Association between Riot ‘Treatment’ and Democratic Presidential and
Congressional Vote Share, 1964-1972
Presidential Elections Congressional Elections
Riot ‘Treatment’   :     :  
( :  ) ( :  )
Percent Black    :     :  
(  :  ) (  :  )
(Percent Black)      :      :  
(  :  ) (  :  )
log(Population)  :     :  
( :  ) ( :  )
Year:        :  
( :  )
Year:         :     :  
( :  ) ( :  )
Year:       :  
( :  )
Year:         :     :  
( :  ) ( :  )
N           
R   :    :  
adj. R   :    :  
Resid. sd  :     :  
Standarderrorsinparentheses
 indicatessigni canceatp <  :  






between    and    . Forpresidentialelections,aonestandarddeviationincreasein
theriot‘treatment’isassociatedwitha- . percentagepointchangeDemocraticvote
share(   CI:- . ,- . ). Forthecongressionalelections,I ndthatexposuretoriot
activityisassociatedwith- . percentagepointchangeDemocraticvoteshare(   CI:
- . ,- . )
 . .  C               M     L     K   ,J .                
Asriotoccurrencewashighlyidiosyncratic(Spilerman,    ;OlzakandShanahan,
    ),manycounterfactualscenarioscouldbeenvisionedinwhichfewereventsofcivil
unrestoccur. Figure . . presentstheexpectedallocationofelectoralvoteinthe    
presidentialelectionunderonesuchplausiblecounterfactual. Inthisscenario,Iestimate
arevisedriot‘treatment’asifMartinLutherKing,Jr.hadnotbeenassassinatedonApril
 th,    and   riotshadnotoccurredintheimmediatewakeofhisdeath.
(Figure . . presentsabarchartofurbanriotsbymonthandshowstheunusual
distributioninApril.)
Toestimatethecounterfactualelection,Iremovethe   riotsfromApril    from
thedataandcalculate rstdiﬀerencesbetweentheobservedriot‘treatment’andthe
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Figure 2.6.1: Plot of the estimated allocation of electoral votes for Humphrey under the counterfactual
scenario of Martin Luther King, Jr. not being assassinated and 136 riots not occurring in April, 1968. The
blue horizontal line indicates the number of electoral votes needed to win the presidency (assuming third
party candidate George Wallace stays in the race receives the same number of electoral votes as in the
actual 1968 election). At 270 electoral votes, Humphrey wins irrespective of what might have happened
with Wallace.















withanadditional  electoralvotesandallowedhimtowinthe    election
comfortablywithatotalof   electoralvotes.¹⁶
Figure . . presentsamapoftheallocationofelectoralvotesinthe    presidential
electionunderthecounterfactualscenarioofMartinLutherKing,Jr.notbeing
assassinatedand   riotsnotoccurringinthewakeofhisdeath. Ascanbeseenin
¹⁵Futureextensionsofthispaperwilla empttomodelthereallocationofvotesinathree-wayraceusing
a multinomial model, Monte Carlo simulations, as well as counterfactual elections at the congressional
level.
¹⁶As Alaska, Hawaii and the District of Columbia are excluded from the statistical model, they are as-







Figure 2.6.2: Choropleth map of the United States with electoral votes allocated under the counterfac-
tual scenario of Martin Luther King, Jr. not being assassinated and 136 riots not occurring in the wake
of his death. As noted in Figure 2.6.1, under the counterfactual, the following states tip from Nixon to
Humphrey: Delaware, Illinois, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio and Wisconsin. In the map, these states are
labeled ‘Humphrey Counterfactual’ in the legend. In this scenario, Humphrey wins the 1968 presidential
election comfortably with an estimated 287 votes in the electoral college.
  Figure . . ,noneofthestatesHumphreyisestimatedtopickup(i.e.Delaware,Illinois,
Missouri,NewJersey,OhioandWisconsin)areSouthern.¹⁷ WhileNixoniswidely
creditedwithhavingwonthe    electionwitha“SouthernStrategy,”inactuality,he
winsveryli leoftheSouthand,inthesecounterfactuals,theswingstatesare
mid-AtlanticandMidwestern. AmoreaccurateinterpretationoftheSouthernStrategyin
    isthatithelpedNixonpeeloﬀwhitemoderatevotersinmiddleAmericabutdid
li leforhimintheSouth. In    ,thethirdpartycandidacyofGeorgeWallacecarries
thedeepsouthbut,hadGeorgeWallacenotrunandallofthedeepsouthstatesgoneto
Nixon,Humphreywouldstillhavewonunderthecounterfactual. In    ,acoalitionof
whiteliberals,whitemoderatesandblackshelpedtheDemocraticpartywinthe
presidencydecisively. In    ,byspli ingthatcoalitionandpullingwhitemoderates
outsideofthesouthintotheRepublicanfold,Nixonprevailed.




(    )toevaluatetheeﬀectofriotsonpartisanship. MartinLutherKing,Jr.was
assassinatedinApril,    and,partlyinresponse,arecord   riotsoccurredoverthe
courseofthemonth. Usingcity-levelweatherdatafromApril    asaninstrumentfor
whetherariotoccurred,Iintendtoinvestigateifurbanriotscausedapartisanshi in
votingbehaviorbetweenthe    and    presidentialelections. Resultsfromthis
¹⁷Missouriisclassi edaspartoftheMidwestbytheUSCensusBureau.
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 eevidencepresentedthusfarsuggeststhatviolentprotestsbyblacksmayhaveplayed
animportantroleinshi ingsupportawayfromDemocratsandtowardsadesireformore
repressivelawenforcement.  elastingconsequencesofthisshi havecontributedtothe
riseofoneofthemostrepressivelawenforcementregimesintheworld(Go schalk,









states,“Idon’tcallitviolencewhenit’sself-defense,Icallitintelligence”(MalcolmX,    ).










socialcontrolinthela er-halfofthe    s,itappearsplausiblethatviolenceassociated
withwhitesupremacistsandnonviolenceassociatedwithblacksinthe rsthalfofthe
    smayhavemovedmoderatewhitestowardselevatingcivilrightstothepositionof
mostimportantprobleminAmerica.
Inhis    presidentialnominationspeech,BarryGoldwaterreceivedarousing
responsewhenhebellowed,“Extremisminthedefenseoflibertyisnovice. Andletme
remindyoualsothatmoderationinthepursuitofjusticeisnovirtue”(Flamm,    ).
 eevidencepresentedinthepaper,however,suggeststhat,inthecontextofU.S.
democraticpolitics,violentextremismmaydomoreharmthangoodtoitsowncause.
 is ndingechoesthatofStephanandChenoweth(    )who ndthatnon-violent
movementsaresuccessfulatachievingtheirgoalsabout  percentofthetimeand
violentmovementsabout  percentofthetime.¹⁹ Similarly,inpost-warAmerica,
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Figure 2.9.1: Plot of the distance decay function for one county





































































































Figure 2.9.2: Line plot of black party identiﬁcation, 1936 to 2004. Sources: (Bositis, 2008). Lines drawn
with loess smoothing function.
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TriggeringPunitiveness
C                                                             ,
                   ?
    .  I           
Inthe    sandearly    s,morethan   incidentsofblack-ledcivilunrestexploded
acrossAmericancities. Atthesametime,inelectionsacrossthecountry,moderatewhite
votersabandonedtheDemocraticpartyinlargenumbersandincreasinglyvotedfor
Republicancandidatespromising“lawandorder.” Whetherthe    sblackuprisings
in uencedrisingwhiteconservatismremainsasubjectofscholarlydebate(Weaver,





LookingatCongressionalandPresidentialelectionsbetween    and    ,Wasow





(Wilkinson,    ;Varshney,    ),Wasowarguesthatviolentnationalistprotestsbya
subordinategrouptriggeredaformofreactionarynationalisminthedominantgroup.
Howdidurbanuprisingsin uencevotingbehavior? Wasow(    )proposestwo
maineﬀects. First,violentprotestsbyblacksincreasedthepoliticalsalienceofracial
boundariesandidentities. Second,civilunrestbyblacksincreasedconcernsaboutsocial
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(Key,    ;Blalock,    ;CullenandWilcox,    ). Despiteasubstantialliterature,the
evidenceinfavoroftheracialthreathypothesisisambiguous. Forexample,Enos(    )




    ;Quillian,    ;GilesandHertz,    ;HillandLeighley,    ;Enos,    ). Other
studies,however,havenotsupportedtheracialthreathypothesis(Voss,    ;Leighley
andVedlitz,    ;Bledsoeetal.,    ). Finally,somestudieshavefoundbothpositive
andnegativeevidence. Enos(    )conductsa eldexperimentinLosAngelesand nds
evidenceofincreasedAfricanAmericanturnoutwhenexposedtocuesofracialthreat
fromLatinosbutnottheconverseasLatinosareunresponsivetosignalsofracialthreat
byAfricanAmericans. BarberandImai(    )geocodeover  millionvoterregistration






    ),thepersistenceofcon ictingresultssuggestthatracialthreatmaybemoreofa
contextualthanauniversalphenomenonandthatscholarsshouldshi fromdebatingthe
existenceofthedynamictoidentifyingthesituationsinwhichgroupthreatoperatesoris
stimulated. Wasow(    )arguesthatviolentprotestsbyanoutgroupmaybeonesuch
situationthatprovokesfeelingsofracialthreatandthisstudya emptstotestthevalidity
ofthathypothesisbyinvestigatingtheroleofviolentandpoliticizedimageryindriving
   feelingsofingroupidenti cationandadesireforsocialcontrol.
 . .  I                    
Haidt(    )arguesthatthehumancapacityfor“groupism,”beitreligious,ethnic,or
alongsomeotherdividingline,isanevolvedsolutiontocollectiveactionproblemsin
whichitisadvantageoustohaveindividualssacri ceforthegreatergoodofthewhole. In
hiswords,humansare“  percentchimpand  percentbee”andourcapacityfor
hive-mindlikebehaviorandcooperationhasbeenenormouslyadaptiveinevolutionary
terms. WorkonSocialIdentity eoryhasalsoshownthatindividualswillsacri cefor
thebene tofgroupsTajfeletal.(    ). BuildingonSocialIdentity eroy,Dawson










SouthCarolinasample. GilliamandIyengar(    )experimentallyinvestigatethe
intersectionofrace,violenceandmediaand ndthatlocalnewsreportingofviolent
crime“‘racializes’politicaldiscourse”byintertwiningpublicopiniononpolicywith









diﬀerentfeelingsofthreat? SidaniusandPra o(    )extendSocialIdentity eoryto







integrityofthegroup-basedsystemofsocialhierarchyitself”(p.    ).
BeyondSidaniusandPra o(    ),though,li lehasbeendonetotesthowpolitical
contentandviolenceinteractwhenassessingfeelingsofracialthreat.
Wheremostofthescholarshiponracialthreatexplainsthephenomenonthrough
someformofantipathytoanoutgroup,KnowlesandPeng(    )’sresultssuggestthe
possibilityofaﬃnitytoaningroupasanindependent(though,likely,o en
interdependent)forcetoconsider. Incontrasttothesemodelsofgroupidentityforged





competitionandcon ict,nothingintheirmodelpresumessuchadynamic.  eirmodel
proposesthataperson’ssenseofwhiteidenti cation“derives(inpart)fromindividuals’
socialexposuretonon-Whitesandsubsequentlyshapesindividuals’cognitionsand
emotionsbybindingevaluationsoftheselftothoseoftheungroup”(p.    ). Echoing
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signi cantlybyrace(BoboandJohnson,    ). Usingframingexperiments,Boboand
Johnson(    ) ndanti-blackaﬀectisasigni cantdriverofthe“tasteforpunishment”
amongwhites. Racialthreat,asmeasuredbyminoritypopulationsize,alsoappearsto
¹Formoreonthecontextualnatureofwhiteidentity,seeMcDermo andSamson(    ).
   playanimportantrole. Anumberofstudies ndthat,evena eraccountingforavariety
ofconfoundingfactorsincludinghomiciderates,thesizeoftheminoritypopulationina
stateisasigni cantpredictorofitspunitivenessasmeasuredthroughindicatorslikethe
incarcerationrateandthepresenceofadeathpenalty(JacobsandCarmichael,    ;
Jacobs,CarmichaelandKent,    ;Jacobs,MaloneandIles,    ).  eroleofviolent
protestsintriggeringpunitivenessisunclear,though.
 . .  A“               ”      ?












² e idiom “circle the wagons” comes from the history of the early American West and is de ned by
Reference.com as a maneuver “to form the wagons of a covered-wagon train into a circle for defensive
purposes, as against Indian a ack” (Dictionary.com,     ).  ough the term can refer to more general
formsofdefensivenessandinwardlooking,itsetymologicalrootsininterracialcon ictmakeitespecially
aptasawaytodescribeatypeofgroupthreat.




























Figure 3.2.1: Typology of events by the tactics utilized, political orientation of event and race of partici-
pants. The ﬁrst phase of this study focuses on variation in responses to violent acts when committed by
blacks as compared with whites. The second phase of the study may focus on a broader range of event
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. Survey . Exit to
MTurk
Figure 3.3.1: Subjects are recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), provide basic demographic
information, are randomized into the “apolitical” or “political” condition and then either receive the treat-
ment or the control condition. Following treatment, subjects take the White Identity Centrality Implicit
Association Test (WICIAT). After the WICIAT, subjects are randomized into one of three ultimatum game
scenarios and, ﬁnally, complete some additional political and racial attitudes survey questions. Upon
completion, subjects are returned to MTurk to be paid.
 isstudyinvestigateshowexposuretomediawithcuesaboutingroups,outgroups,





Figure . . presentsa owchartshowinghowsubjectsmovethroughtheexperiment.
Overall,thedesignhasthreedimensionsacrosswhichasubjectcouldberandomly





produce a signi cantly diﬀerent response in racial identi cation among members of the dominant group.
Such a result might help explain Stephan and Chenoweth (    )’s  nding that non-violent movements
areabouttwiceassuccessfulatachievingtheirgoalsthanviolentmovements.












NationalElectionStudies,    ).  esurveyquestionsaredesignedtoteaseoutifthe
variousstimuliaboutrace,politicsandviolencecausemeaningfuldiﬀerencesinopinion.
 .  D   
SubjectsforthisstudyweredrawnfromAmazonMechanicalTurk’s(MTurk)online
labormarket.⁵ Subjectswerepaid  .  forcompletinga  minutesurvey(additionally,
  percentofsubjectsreceived  .  foracceptingtheoﬀerintheultimatumgame).  e
studywasdescribedasasurveyabout“Videogamesandpublicopinion.” Approximately,
  percentoftherespondentsself-reportedbeingnon-Hispanicwhite(andnotofmixed
⁵InkeepingwiththeresultsofBerinsky,HuberandLenz(    ),Imakenoclaimsabouttheexternal
validityofthisnational,unrepresentativeconveniencesample.
   racialancestry). A erexcludingnon-whitesubjectsfromtherespondentpool,   
subjectsremained. Table . . presentssummarystatisticsofselecteddemographic
informationforthewhiterespondents. Asthesubjectswererandomlyassignedtothe
varioustreatmentandcontrolconditions,noneofthedemographicinformation
presentedinTable . . isusedinthestatisticalanalysesthatfollow.⁶
Table 3.4.1: Summary Demographic Characteristics of White Respondents
Variable N Mean Min Max SD
  Male      .    .    .    .  
  Democrat      .    .    .    .  
  Republican     .    .    .    .  
  Independent      .    .    .    .  
  Northeast     .    .    .    .  
  Midwest     .    .    .    .  
  South      .    .    .    .  
  West     .    .    .    .  
  HighSchool/GED      .    .    .    .  
   BA      .    .    .    .  
   MA+    .    .    .    .  
   Self-reportedIncome       ,   .    ,   .      ,   .     ,   .  
⁶In a future extension of this paper, I would like to considerably expand the number of subjects and
a empttosubsetthedatabygender,region(i.e. South),incomeandotherpossiblefactorstoseeifother
pa ernsemerge.
    .  C                                                     










armedandunarmedmen. SeeFigure . . forexampleimagesofunarmedmen.
Figure 3.5.1: Two sample images from the Police Ofﬁcer’s Dilemma Task of an unarmed white man hold-
ing a cell phone and an unarmed black man holding a wallet in front of a complex background. Images
like these, and those of armed men, are used in both the apolitical and political outgroup violence exper-
iment.
Forthisstudy,thePODTismodi edintwoways. First,subjectsaredividedinto
   Figure 3.5.2: Two sample images of an armed black man. The image on the left is used in the apolitical
outgroup violence experiment and comes from the original PODT. The image on the right includes the













modi ed slightly to be as short as possible. All slogans were selected or edited to be plausibly applicable
to both black and white political activists.  e original PODT images were retouched to incorporate the
slogansinwaysthatwereappropriatetoeachphoto.  elistofsloganscanbeseeninSection . . .
⁸In a future extension, I would like to compare results from single race imagery to no race imagery
and mixed race imagery. In addition, I would like the treatment to incorporate video imagery of actual
protests. While a majority of the video footage might be ambiguous as to key details of the event (i.e.
   Followingexposuretooneofthefourvideogamescenarios(again,seeFigure . . for
thefourPODTconditions)subjectscompletetheWhiteIdentityCentralityImplicit
AssociationTest(WICIAT)tomeasurethedegreetowhichtheyseethemselvesas
membersofawhiteingroup(KnowlesandPeng,    ). Inthecontextofthisstudy,the
WICIATscoreisanindicatoroftheeﬀectsonwhiteidentityofexposuretocuesabout
race,politicsandviolence.  eWICIATisanextensionoftheImplicitAssociationTest
(IAT)developedbyGreenwald,McGheeandSchwartz(    ). KnowlesandPeng
(    )conceptualizewhiteidenti cationas,“thedegreetowhichanindividualhas










primary actors were white or black. Another approach might be to use other less visceral but more easily
manipulatedmedia,suchasnewspaperclips,torepresentavarietyofeventswithtextandstillimages.
⁹Knowles and Peng (    ) validate the WICIAT with four other tests. For example, they assess how
exposure to an outgroup changes racial identi cation and  nd, “participants from largely non-White re-
gionsscoredhigherinimplicitWhiteidentitycentralitythandidparticipantsfrompredominantlyWhite
counties.” In a validation test in which subjects are asked to categorize racially ambiguous faces, “partic-
ipants scoring high on the WICIAT tended to exclude racially ambiguous faces from the White ungroup
…morethandidweaklyidenti edparticipants.” Finally,inresponsetoreadingabouttheepidemicofblack
lynchings in American history, Knowles and Peng  nd “high-WICIAT participants experienced higher
levels of negative self-evaluative emotion (i.e., guilt, shame, and embarrassment) than did low-WICIAT
individuals.”
   Table 3.5.1: Summary Statistics of White Identity Centrality
Variable Condition N Mean Min Max SD
  WhiteIdentityCentrality Allimages      .   - .    .    .  
  WhiteIdentityCentrality Whiteimages      .   - .    .    .  
  WhiteIdentityCentrality Blackimages      .   - .    .    .  
  WhiteIdentityCentrality Politicalimages      .   - .    .    .  
  WhiteIdentityCentrality Apoliticalimages      .   - .    .    .  
  WhiteIdentityCentrality White&politicalimages     .   - .    .    .  
  WhiteIdentityCentrality White&apoliticalimages     .   - .    .    .  
  WhiteIdentityCentrality Black&politicalimages     .   - .    .    .  
  WhiteIdentityCentrality Black&apoliticalimages     .   - .    .    .  
Table . . presentssummarystatisticsofscoresontheWICIATforallsubjectsand
forthosesubjectsexposedtowhiteimages,blackimages,politicalimages,apolitical




Figure . . plotstheestimateddiﬀerenceinmeanWICIATscoresand  percent
con denceintervalsusingWelch’sTwoSamplet-test.  e rstestimateisforthe
¹⁰Unexpectedly, subjects shown the white images exhibit higher mean WICIAT scores than those ex-
posed to the images of black men. In other words, ingroup imagery raised group identi cation and/or
outgroupimageryloweredgroupidenti cation. Onepossibleexplanationforthisoutcomeisthat,indis-
ambiguating armed from unarmed men, the subject is forced to develop a more complicated and sympa-








Figure 3.5.3: Difference in means for White Identity Centrality by white images versus black images and
political images versus apolitical images.
Whateﬀectdoesexposuretoimagesofarmedandunarmedwhitemen(ascompared
withsimilarimagesfeaturingblackmen)haveonidenti cationwithawhiteingroup?
Figure . . suggeststhatexposuretoimagesofwhitemen(ascomparedtoblackmen)
signi cantlyincreasedsubjects’WhiteIdentityCentralitymeasuresbyabout .  units.
 escalefortheWICIATrunsfrom- . to . andtheresultsinFigure . . representa
shi ofabout .  ofastandarddeviationforthesubjectsofthestudy. Insubstantive




   association.”¹¹  oughneithershi isdramatic,bothsuggestthat,atthemargin,itis
possibletomeaningfullyincreaseingroupidenti cation.
Figure 3.5.4: Difference in means for White Identity Centrality by interaction of racialized and politicized
images.
Figure . . disaggregatestheresultsinFigure . . toviewtheinteractioneﬀectsof





approximately .  intheirWICIATor . ofastandarddeviationwithinthissample.
 emeanWICIATscoresinthethreeotherconditionsofthemodi edPODTarenot
¹¹Conventional interpretation of the IAT suggests scores between   to  .   exhibit “li le or no” au-
tomatic preference. Scores > .   but   .   exhibit “a slight” automatic preference. Scores > .  
but   .   exhibit “a moderate” automatic preference and scores   .   are interpreted to exhibit “a
strong” automaticpreference.
   statisticallydiﬀerentfromzero.
 . .  D   W    I       C                                   ?
Table 3.5.2: Logistic Regression of White Identity Centrality on Favoring Indeﬁnite Detention for Sus-
pected Terrorists without Due Process, by Exposure to Images
White White& White& Black Black& Black&
(All) Political Apolitical (All) Political Apolitical
WhiteIdentityCentrality  :    :     :    :     :    :  
( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  )
N                    
AIC    :     :     :      :     :     :  
BIC    :      :     :      :     :     :  
logL    :      :      :      :      :      :  
Standarderrorsinparentheses
 indicatessigni canceatp <  :  
Isthereanysubstantiveeﬀectofanincreaseinasubject’sWICIATscore? Two
additionalresultssuggeststhereis. Followingexposuretothemodi edPODTandthe





Table . . presentstheresultsofsixlogisticregressionsontherelationshipbetween
WhiteIdentityCentralityandfavoringoropposingamorepunitivecriminaljustice













drivenentirelybytheeﬀectsofblackandapoliticalimages. AsTable . . presents,the
eﬀectofshowingsubjectsblackandpoliticalimagesisstatisticallyindistinguishablefrom
zero.  eeﬀectofblackandapoliticalimagesishighlysigni cant. Itappearsthatthe
inclusionofpoliticalcontentinthetreatmentsigni cantlya enuatestheeﬀectof
exposuretoblackandapoliticalimages.
 eresultsinTable . . alsooﬀersomeinsightintopossiblemechanismsbywhich
racialthreatmayoperate. First,exposuretoviolencebyaningroupdoesli letolink
¹²AlldatawerecollectedbeforetheBostonMarathonbombingonApril  th,    .
¹³ roughout this paper, I convert the log odds coeﬃcients of of logit regressions into more inter-
pretablepercentagepointchangesinoddsratios.
¹⁴RemovingtheobservationswithlowestandthehighestWICIATscoresa enuatesthisresultslightly
and the coeﬃcient on White Identity Centrality, for subjects exposed only to black images, is signi cant
atthe  percentlevel,notthe percentlevel.
   ingroupidentitytoa itudesaboutdueprocess. Exposuretoviolencebyanoutgroup,
however,appearstocauseasigni cantincreaseinthesalienceofwhiteidentitywith
regardtoissuesofsafetyandjustice. Second,incontrasttothepredictionsofSidanius
andPra o(    ),inthiscaseitappearsthatperceptionsofapoliticalviolencebyan
outgroup,ascomparedwithpoliticalviolence,maybeespeciallycriticalinheightening
thesalienceofwhiteidentitywithregardtopunitiveness.¹⁵
 eresultsinTable . . alsospeaktoalargerdebateinsocialscienceabouthow
violentprotestsarecategorized. Termslike“riot”and“rebellion”conveydiﬀerent
interpretationsaboutwhetheramovementoreventwas“merecriminality”orapolitical
“uprising.” Intheformercase,theresultsinTable . . suggestincreasingWhiteIdentity
Centralityisstronglyassociatedwithfavoringgreaterpunitivenessand,inthela er,no
eﬀectatall.  eseresultsalsohaveimportantimplicationsinthecontextofthepolitical






 . .  D   W    I       C                                    ?
¹⁵ at political violence by an outgroup did not increase the salience of white identity in this case
may be an artifact of several distinctive aspects of this study. For example, political slogans like “ ght
forfreedom”or“nototyranny”mayprimesubjectstobemoreconcernedwithissuesofdueprocesswith
suspected terrorists.  e slogans may also be perceived to support right-of-center values and, therefore,
dampen anti-black aﬀect by countering stereotypes of blacks as liberals. In the future I plan to run a sen-
timentanalysisofthesloganstotestwhethertheyareperceivedtohavealiberalorconservativeskew.
    eunfairultimatumgameexperimentsuggestswaysinwhichracialidenti cation,as
measuredbyWICIAT,mightin uenceactionsaswellasopinions. Inaconventional






madebyproposersistosplitthemoney  –  . Oﬀersoflessthan  percentofthetotal
sumaretypicallyrejectedbyabouthalfoftheresponders(Yamagishietal.,    ;











¹⁷ ough ten cents is not a lot of money relative to the median American income, it represented a
possible  percentbonusforasinglekeystrokeinataskthatsubjectsknewwouldtakeabout  minutes
andforwhichthey’dbepaidatarateofabout  .  aminute.
¹⁸In a manipulation check presented at the end of the survey,    percent of the respondents indicated
that they found the oﬀer to be unfair,   percent indicated they found the oﬀer to be fair and    percent
indicatedtheywereuncertain.
   Table 3.5.3: White Identity on Accepting an Unfair Offer in an Ultimatum Game, by Exposure to White &
Political, White & Apolitical, Black & Political and Black & Apolitical Images
White White& White& Black Black& Black&
(All) Political Apolitical (All) Political Apolitical
WhiteIdentityCentrality  :    :    :     :    :     :  
( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  )
N                    
AIC    :      :      :      :      :      :  
BIC    :      :      :      :      :      :  
logL     :      :      :       :      :      :  
Standarderrorsinparentheses
 indicatessigni canceatp <  :  
oﬀerinanultimatumgame? IndependentoftheWICIATscore,subjectsacceptedthe
unfairoﬀeronaverage  percentofthetime. Table . . presentstheresultsofsix
logisticregressionsinwhichthepredictorisWhiteIdentityCentralityandtheoutcomeis
whethersubjectsacceptedorrejectedtheunfairoﬀer.  e rstthreecolumnsof






associatedwithan   percentincreaseintheoddsofacceptinganoﬀer. Conversely,
exposingsubjectstoblackandapoliticalimages(butnotblackimagesgenerallyorblack




Figure . . presentsaplo edversionoftheresultsincolumn ofTable . . .
Figure . . isasca erplot,forsubjectsexposedtowhiteimages,oftherelationship
betweenWhiteIdentityCentralityandacceptingtheunfairoﬀer.  esmoothedline
indicatesthepredictedprobabilityofacceptingtheoﬀerasWhiteIdentityCentrality
increases(witha  percentcon denceintervalindarkergray). AsinTable . . ,for
subjectsexposedtothewhiteimages,increasingWhiteIdentityCentralityisassociated
withagreaterwillingnesstoacceptanunfairoﬀer. Bycontrast,Figure . . plotsthe





 .  D                                                          





   Figure 3.5.5: Among subjects who have been exposed to white images, irrespective of whether the
images are political or apolitical, increasing White Identity Centrality is associated with an increasing
probability of accepting an offer in the ultimatum game. The blue line is a smoothed logistic regression
line estimating the predicted probability of accepting an offer as White Identity Centrality increases. The
grey area around the blue line is the 95 percent conﬁdence interval.
twoquestionsinformthetasteforpunishmentexperiments.
Asmentionedpreviously,intheunfairultimatumgameexperiment,subjectsrespond
toaproposalinwhich  .  issplittwowayssuchthat  .  wouldgototheproposer
and  .  wouldgotothesubject. Undertherulesofthegame,rejectingsuchanoﬀer






   Figure 3.5.6: Among subjects who have been exposed to black and apolitical images (but not black and
political images), increasing White Identity Centrality is associated with a sharply decreasing probability
of accepting an offer in the ultimatum game.








¹⁹ e names are taken from Bertrand and Mullainathan (    ). To identify names that signal race,
Bertrand and Mullainathan collect baby name data from Massachuse s birth certi cates between     
and    .  eyde neracially distinctivenamesas, “thosethathavethehighestratio of frequencyin one
racialgrouptofrequencyintheotherracialgroup”(p.    ).  eyfurthervalidatetheracialdistinctiveness
ofthenameswithasmallsurveyinChicago.
   Table 3.6.1: Summary Statistics of Effects of Images and ‘White’ Name as Co-Player on Accepting an
Unfair Offer in an Ultimatum Game
Variable Condition  Condition  N Mean Min Max SD
  Acceptoﬀer Allimages ‘White’name      .    .    .    .  
  Acceptoﬀer Whiteimages ‘White’name     .    .    .    .  
  Acceptoﬀer Blackimages ‘White’name     .    .    .    .  
  Acceptoﬀer Politicalimages ‘White’name     .    .    .    .  
  Acceptoﬀer Apoliticalimages ‘White’name     .    .    .    .  
  Acceptoﬀer White&politicalimages ‘White’name     .    .    .    .  
  Acceptoﬀer White&apoliticalimages ‘White’name     .    .    .    .  
  Acceptoﬀer Black&politicalimages ‘White’name     .    .    .    .  
  Acceptoﬀer Black&apoliticalimages ‘White’name     .    .    .    .  
Table . . presentsthesummarystatisticsoftheeﬀectsofexposingsubjectstosignals
aboutrace,violenceandpoliticsontheirpropensitytoacceptorrejectanunfairoﬀer
fromaco-playerwithatypicallywhitename. AsindicatedinRow ofTable . . ,across
allsubjectsplayingtheunfairultimatumgameagainsta‘white’player,themean
acceptanceratewas  percent.  eremainingrowsofTable . . ,withtheexceptionof
therowfortheblackandapoliticalcondition,showli levariation. Subjectsexposedto
theblackandapoliticalimages(Row )acceptedonly  percentoftheunfairoﬀers.
Table . . presentstheresultsofsixlogisticregressionsinwhichthenameofthe
co-playeristhepredictorvariableandacceptingorrejectinganunfairoﬀerinthe
ultimatumgameistheoutcome. ForallobservationsinTable . . ,halfofthesubjects
wererandomlyassignedtypicallywhitenamesastheco-playerandhalfofthesubjects
   Table 3.6.2: Logistic Regression of Effect of Images and ‘White’ Co-Player on Accepting an Offer in an
Unfair Ultimatum Game (as Compared to ‘Your partner’)
White White& White& Black Black& Black&
(All) Political Apolitical (All) Political Apolitical
WhiteIdentityCentrality  :    :    :     :    :     :  
( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  )
N                    
AIC    :     :     :      :     :     :  
BIC    :     :      :      :      :     :  
logL    :      :      :      :      :      :  
Standarderrorsinparentheses







signi cantlymorepunitive. Tovisualizetheseresults,seeFigure . . intheAppendix.
Howdosubjectsrespondwhentheirco-playeris‘black’? Table . . oﬀerssummary
statisticsfortheeﬀectsofimagesonratesofacceptinganunfairoﬀerwhenasubjectis




   Table 3.6.3: Summary Statistics of Effects of Images and ‘Black’ Name as Co-Player on Accepting an
Unfair Offer in an Ultimatum Game
Variable Condition  Condition  N Mean Min Max SD
  Acceptoﬀer Allimages ‘Black’name      .    .    .    .  
  Acceptoﬀer Whiteimages ‘Black’name     .    .    .    .  
  Acceptoﬀer Blackimages ‘Black’name     .    .    .    .  
  Acceptoﬀer Politicalimages ‘Black’name     .    .    .    .  
  Acceptoﬀer Apoliticalimages ‘Black’name     .    .    .    .  
  Acceptoﬀer White&politicalimages ‘Black’name     .    .    .    .  
  Acceptoﬀer White&apoliticalimages ‘Black’name     .    .    .    .  
  Acceptoﬀer Black&politicalimages ‘Black’name     .    .    .    .  








signi cant. Table . . presentstheestimatedeﬀectsofexposuretovariouscombinations
ofimagesandbeingassigneda‘white’co-playerascomparedwitha‘black’co-player.
NoneofthecoeﬃcientsinTable . . arestatisticallydiﬀerentfromzero.
 ereresultsoftheunfairultimatumgameexperimentsarealsoimportant
theoretically. First,thegreaterwillingnessofsubjectstoacceptanunfairoﬀerwhen
   Table 3.6.4: Logistic Regression of Effect of Images and ‘Black’ Co-Player on Accepting an Offer in an
Unfair Ultimatum Game (as Compared to ‘Your partner’)
White White& White& Black Black& Black&
(All) Political Apolitical (All) Political Apolitical
‘Black’Name  :    :    :     :    :     :  
( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  )
N                    
AIC    :     :     :      :     :     :  
BIC    :     :     :      :     :      :  
logL    :      :      :      :      :      :  
Standarderrorsinparentheses
 indicatessigni canceatp <  :  
Table 3.6.5: Effect of Images and ‘White’ Co-Player on Accepting an Offer in an Unfair Ultimatum Game
(as Compared to ‘Black’ Co-Player)
White White& White& Black Black& Black&
(All) Political Apolitical (All) Political Apolitical
‘White’Name  :    :    :    :    :     :  
( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  ) ( :  )
N                    
AIC    :     :     :      :     :     :  
BIC    :      :     :      :     :      :  
logL    :      :      :      :      :      :  
Standarderrorsinparentheses
 indicatessigni canceatp <  :  













 .  D         
Doviolentproteststriggera“circlethewagon”mentality?  eresultsofthisexperiment
oﬀertentativesupportwhileraisingadditionalquestions. First,aspredictedbyWasow










levelsofstatisticalsign cance(seeFigure . . intheAppendix).
Beyondthecaseoftheviolentprotestsinthe    s,thisexperimentexploreswhether
racialidentityshouldbeseenassomething xedandstaticor,potentially,moredynamic
andresponsivetostimuli. Inthecontextofthispaper,racialidenti cationcanbeviewed














behavior. Inshort,racialidenti cationma ersinpoliticsandispossibleinstatistics.
    .  A       










  . JointheResistance
  . NotoTyranny
  . FightforFreedom
  . BallotorBullet
  . RevolutionisBrewing
  . DeclareIndependence
  . MyVoiceOrMyGun
  . It’sUsAgainst em
  . Revolt
  . MyPeople,MyNation
  . TakeOurCountryBack
    . .  S       S             E          I          N        C -P         
A          U     O    
Table 3.8.1: Summary Statistics of Effects of Images and ‘White’ names, ‘Black’ Names and ‘Your part-
ner’ as Co-Players on Accepting an Unfair Offer in an Ultimatum Game
Variable Condition  Condition  N Mean Min Max SD
  Acceptoﬀer Allimages Allnames      .    .    .    .  
  Acceptoﬀer Allimages ‘white’name      .    .    .    .  
  Acceptoﬀer Allimages ‘black’name      .    .    .    .  
  Acceptoﬀer Allimages ‘Yourpartner’      .    .    .    .  
  Acceptoﬀer Whiteimages ‘white’name     .    .    .    .  
  Acceptoﬀer Whiteimages ‘black’name     .    .    .    .  
  Acceptoﬀer Whiteimages ‘Yourpartner’     .    .    .    .  
  Acceptoﬀer Blackimages ‘white’name     .    .    .    .  
  Acceptoﬀer Blackimages ‘black’name     .    .    .    .  
   Acceptoﬀer Blackimages ‘Yourpartner’     .    .    .    .  
   Acceptoﬀer Politicalimages ‘white’name     .    .    .    .  
   Acceptoﬀer Politicalimages ‘black’name     .    .    .    .  
   Acceptoﬀer Politicalimages ‘Yourpartner’     .    .    .    .  
   Acceptoﬀer Apoliticalimages ‘white’name     .    .    .    .  
   Acceptoﬀer Apoliticalimages ‘black’name     .    .    .    .  
   Acceptoﬀer Apoliticalimages ‘Yourpartner’     .    .    .    .  
    . .  D           M    P      E       I       I       
Figure 3.8.1: Difference in Mean Plots for Effect of Images on Ideology
    . .  D           M    P      E       I       A           ‘W    ’
N     ‘Y   P      ’
Figure 3.8.2: Difference in Means Plot for Effect of Images on Accepting for ‘White’ Name vs ‘Your Part-
ner’
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